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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge, with whom RENDELL, 
FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, 
VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, join. 
 The instant appeal arises out of the warrantless 
installation of a Global Positioning System device (a “GPS” 
or “GPS device”) and subsequent surveillance by agents 
working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) of a 
van while investigating multiple pharmacy burglaries. The 
warrantless surveillance led to evidence of the involvement of 
brothers Harry, Michael, and Mark Katzin (collectively, 
“Appellees”) in the burglaries. Slightly more than a year after 
the GPS installation and surveillance, the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Jones, which held that the 
installation of a GPS device by government agents upon the 
exterior of a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements is a Fourth Amendment 
“search.” 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). As a result, Appellees 
successfully moved prior to trial to suppress the evidence 
collected pursuant to the warrantless GPS surveillance, 
effectively ending the Government’s prosecution. We 
conclude that the evidence is admissible under the good faith 
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exception to the exclusionary rule and reverse the District 
Court’s grant of Appellees’ suppression motions. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2009 and 2010, the FBI and local police officers 
were investigating a series of pharmacy burglaries occurring 
in the greater Philadelphia area, including Delaware, 
Maryland, and New Jersey. The modus operandi was 
consistent: the perpetrators, who targeted Rite Aid 
pharmacies, disabled alarm systems by cutting the external 
telephone lines.  
 
 Eventually, Harry Katzin emerged as a suspect. A 
local electrician, he had recently been arrested for attempting 
to burglarize a Rite Aid pharmacy, and he and his brothers 
had criminal histories involving arrests for burglary and theft. 
Increasingly, investigators received reports of Harry Katzin’s 
involvement in suspicious activities in the vicinity of Rite Aid 
pharmacies.1 Their investigation revealed the make and 
                                              
1 For example, in October 2010 Pennsylvania police found 
Harry Katzin crouching behind bushes near a Rite Aid. They 
did not arrest him but the following day discovered the Rite 
Aid’s phone lines had been cut. A month later, police 
searched Harry Katzin’s van after discovering him and two 
other individuals (including his brother Michael) sitting inside 
it near a Rite Aid. Police found tools, work gloves, and ski 
masks in the van but did not arrest the men. Again, police 
later discovered the Rite Aid’s phone lines were cut. Finally, 
that same month, surveillance camera footage from a 
burglarized New Jersey Rite Aid showed a van similar to 
Harry Katzin’s parked in its vicinity.  
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model of Harry Katzin’s van, as well as where he primarily 
parked it, and the agents sought to electronically surveil him. 
The agents conferred with an Assistant United States 
Attorney (“AUSA”) who advised them, in conformity with 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy at the time, that 
installing a battery-powered GPS device upon Harry Katzin’s 
van on a public street and tracking its movements on public 
thoroughfares would not require a warrant. Subsequently, on 
December 13, 2010, without a warrant, officers magnetically 
attached a battery powered “slap-on” GPS device2 onto the 
undercarriage of Harry Katzin’s van while it was parked on a 
public street. 
  
 Two days later, at approximately 10:45 p.m. on 
December 15, 2010, the GPS device indicated that Harry 
Katzin’s van had left Philadelphia and proceeded on public 
thoroughfares to the immediate vicinity of a Rite Aid in 
Hamburg, Pennsylvania. According to the GPS device, the 
van drove around the area before stopping and remaining 
stationary for over two hours. The agents contacted local 
police but instructed them to maintain a wide perimeter to 
avoid alerting the suspects. Consequently, the GPS provided 
the only evidence of the van’s proximity to the Rite Aid. The 
van left its position at nearly 3:00 a.m. and state troopers 
                                              
2 A “slap-on” GPS device magnetically attaches to a vehicle’s 
exterior and is battery powered, requiring no electrical 
connection to the vehicle. It uses a network of satellites to 
calculate its location and transmits the data to a central server. 
An officer need not physically track nor be near the 
automobile. The GPS that the agents used had a battery life of 
one week (although the agents could have changed the 
batteries, if necessary).  
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followed. Meanwhile, local police confirmed that someone 
had burglarized the Rite Aid and relayed this information to 
the troopers, who pulled over the van. Troopers found Harry 
Katzin at the wheel with Michael and Mark as passengers. 
From outside the van, troopers observed items consistent with 
the burglary of a Rite Aid.3 They arrested Appellees and 
impounded the van. In all, the warrantless GPS surveillance 
lasted for two days and occurred only on public 
thoroughfares.  
  
 Appellees were indicted and each moved to suppress 
the evidence recovered from the van. They argued that the 
warrantless installation and monitoring of the GPS device 
violated their Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to Jones. 
The Government argued, inter alia, that even if Jones now 
required a warrant, the evidence should not be suppressed 
because the agents acted in good faith when installing and 
monitoring the GPS device.  
 
 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granted Appellees’ suppression 
motions. United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 
1646894, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012). The District Court 
found that a warrant was required under Jones. Id. at *5–6. 
Relying on Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), it 
also rejected the Government’s good faith argument, refusing 
to “extend the good faith exception to encompass the conduct 
in this case.” Id. at *10. Finally, it concluded that, contrary to 
the Government’s contention, passengers Mark and Michael 
                                              
3 The state trooper saw merchandise, pill bottles, Rite Aid 
storage bins, tools, a duffel bag, and a surveillance system 
with severed wires.  
 9 
 
Katzin had standing to challenge the search of Harry Katzin’s 
van. Id. at *11. The Government appealed.  
 
 A panel of this Court unanimously affirmed the 
District Court’s conclusions that the agents’ conduct required 
a warrant and that all three brothers had standing. United 
States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2013), vacated by 
United States v. Katzin, No. 12-2548, 2013 WL 7033666 (3d 
Cir. Dec. 12, 2013) (granting rehearing en banc). However, 
the panel divided over whether the good faith exception 
applied and, consequently, whether suppression was 
appropriate. See id. at 216–41 (Van Antwerpen, J., 
dissenting). The Government petitioned for, and we granted, 
rehearing en banc on the singular issue of whether the 
evidence recovered from Harry Katzin’s van should be 
shielded from suppression pursuant to the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Katzin, 2013 WL 
7033666, at *1. We conducted the en banc rehearing on May 
28, 2014. 
 
II. DISCUSSION4 
 
 The Fourth Amendment mandates that  
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a motion to suppress, “we review 
a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we 
exercise de novo review over its application of the law to 
those factual findings.” United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 
651, 660 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment 
only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); see 
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 
(1995) (“[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’”). Searches 
conducted absent a warrant are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, subject to certain exceptions. United 
States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012). To deter 
Fourth Amendment violations, when the Government seeks to 
admit evidence collected pursuant to an illegal search or 
seizure, the judicially created doctrine known as the 
exclusionary rule at times suppresses that evidence and makes 
it unavailable at trial. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
139 (2009). However, even when the Government violates 
the Fourth Amendment, ill-gotten evidence will not be 
suppressed when the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule applies. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
920–26 (1984) (refusing to exclude fruits of unreasonable 
search because officer acted with objective good faith on later 
invalidated warrant). 
 
 Consequently, we need not determine whether the 
agents’ conduct was an unreasonable search because, even 
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assuming so, we conclude that the good faith exception 
applies, and that suppression is unwarranted.5 However, we 
caution that, after Jones, law enforcement should carefully 
consider that a warrant may be required when engaging in 
such installation and surveillance. We also need not reach the 
issue of whether Mark and Michael Katzin have standing to 
challenge the agents’ conduct because, even assuming so, the 
outcome—admission of the evidence at trial—would remain 
unchanged.6 See United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 553 
(3d Cir. 2010) (noting that district court only needed to 
determine “standing” to the extent it held searches 
unreasonable); United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 
F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to decide standing 
where court determined that law enforcement properly 
conducted warrantless search). We nevertheless acknowledge 
that, under the law of the Third Circuit, United States v. 
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006) appears to control. 
 
 A. The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith  
  Exception 
                                              
5 This approach is consistent with that taken by our sister 
circuits when addressing the installation and use of GPS or 
GPS-like devices that occurred prior to Jones. See, e.g., 
United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 834 (5th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
6 We use the term “standing” as shorthand for determining 
whether a litigant’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. 
See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2006).  
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 Whether to suppress evidence under the exclusionary 
rule is a separate question from whether the Government has 
violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2006). Despite its 
connection to the Fourth Amendment, there is no 
constitutional right to have the evidentiary fruits of an illegal 
search or seizure suppressed at trial. See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2426 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “says nothing 
about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of [its] 
command”). The exclusionary rule is instead “a judicially 
created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth 
Amendment.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 
Simply because a Fourth Amendment violation occurs does 
not mean that exclusion necessarily follows. E.g., Herring, 
555 U.S. at 140. Rather, “exclusion ‘has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse.’” Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. 
at 591). 
 
 Application of the exclusionary rule is instead limited 
to those “unusual cases” in which it may achieve its 
objective: to appreciably deter governmental violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, 918; see also 
United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 346 (3d Cir. 2011). To 
the extent the promise of admitting illegally seized evidence 
creates an incentive to disregard Fourth Amendment rights, 
the exclusionary rule removes that incentive by “forbid[ding] 
the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” Herring, 
555 U.S. at 139. It thereby “compel[s] respect for the [Fourth 
Amendment’s] constitutional guaranty.” Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
 
 However, while “[r]eal deterrent value” is necessary 
for the exclusionary rule to apply, there are other 
 13 
 
considerations and it alone is not sufficient. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2427. Deterrence must also outweigh the “substantial social 
costs” of exclusion. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. These costs often 
include omitting “reliable, trustworthy evidence” of a 
defendant’s guilt, thereby “suppress[ing] the truth and 
set[ting] [a] criminal loose in the community without 
punishment.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. As this result 
conflicts with the “truth-finding functions of judge and jury,” 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980), exclusion 
is a “bitter pill,” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, swallowed only as 
a “last resort,” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. Accordingly, to 
warrant exclusion, the deterrent value of suppression must 
overcome the resulting social costs. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 
 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was 
developed to effectuate this balance and has been applied 
“across a range of cases.”7 Id. at 2428. Where the particular 
facts of a case indicate that law enforcement officers “act[ed] 
with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their 
conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct involve[d] only 
simple, ‘isolated’ negligence,” there is no illicit conduct to 
deter. Id. at 2427–28 (citations omitted) (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 909; Herring 555 U.S. at 137). In such circumstances, 
“the deterrence rationale loses much of its force and exclusion 
                                              
7 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (applying good faith exception 
where officers relied on binding appellate precedent); 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48 (same, with police-maintained 
outstanding warrant database); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
14–16 (1995) (same, with court-maintained database); Illinois 
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (same, with 
subsequently invalidated statute); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
(same, with subsequently invalidated warrant).   
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cannot pay its way.” Id. at 2428 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 
907 n.6, 919) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Alternatively, where law enforcement conduct is “deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent” or involves “recurring or 
systemic negligence,” deterrence holds greater value and 
often outweighs the associated costs. Id. at 2427–28 (quoting 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Put differently, exclusion is appropriate only where law 
enforcement conduct is both “sufficiently deliberate” that 
deterrence is effective and “sufficiently culpable” that 
deterrence outweighs the costs of suppression. Herring, 555 
U.S. at 144. Thus, determining whether the good faith 
exception applies requires courts to answer the “objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal in light 
of all of the circumstances.” Id. at 145 (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922 n.23) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
  1. Davis v. United States 
 In Davis, the Supreme Court applied the good faith 
exception in the context of law enforcement officers’ reliance 
on judicial decisions. 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24. Specifically, 
Davis held that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the 
exclusionary rule.” Id. Davis’ holding implicated two prior 
Supreme Court decisions, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981) and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 
 In Belton, the Supreme Court announced a seemingly 
broad and permissive standard regarding searches incident to 
arrest. 453 U.S. at 460 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a 
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he 
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may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.” (footnote 
omitted)). It was widely understood that the Court had issued 
a bright-line rule, and that vehicle searches incident to the 
arrest of recent occupants were reasonable, regardless of 
whether the arrestee “was within reaching distance of the 
vehicle at the time of the search.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424. 
However, as Davis noted, the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decision in Gant upset this interpretation of Belton. Id. at 
2425. After Gant, a vehicle search incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest was only constitutionally reasonable where 
(1) “the arrestee [was] within reaching distance of the vehicle 
during the search, or (2) . . . the police ha[d] reason to believe 
that the vehicle contain[ed] ‘evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest.’” Id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). 
 
 Before Gant, the Eleventh Circuit had been one of 
many federal appeals courts to read Belton as establishing a 
permissive rule. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 
822 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding search of vehicle conducted 
after recent occupant was “pulled from the vehicle, 
handcuffed, laid on the ground, and placed under arrest”). 
After Belton and Gonzalez, but before Gant, police officers in 
a case arising in the Eleventh Circuit arrested both the driver 
of a vehicle and the vehicle’s occupant, Willie Davis. 131 S. 
Ct. at 2425. After handcuffing and placing them in the back 
of separate patrol cars, officers searched the vehicle and 
found a revolver in Davis’ jacket. Id. The District Court 
denied Davis’ Fourth Amendment challenge, but during the 
pendency of his appeal from his conviction for possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon, the Supreme Court decided 
Gant. Id. at 2426. Accordingly, when Davis reached the 
Supreme Court, it was necessary to address “whether to apply 
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the exclusionary rule when the police conduct a search in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial 
precedent,” such as Gonzalez. Id. at 2428.  
 
 Crucial to Davis’ holding that suppression was not 
warranted was the “acknowledged absence of police 
culpability.” Id. The officers’ conduct was innocent because 
they “followed the Eleventh Circuit’s Gonzalez precedent to 
the letter” and conducted themselves “in strict compliance 
with then-binding Circuit law.” Id. Because “well-trained 
officers will and should use” a law enforcement tactic that 
“binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes,” 
evidence suppression would only serve to deter what had 
been reasonable police work. Id. at 2429. As this outcome 
was inimical to the exclusionary rule’s purpose, namely 
deterrence, the Supreme Court applied the good faith 
exception to the officers’ conduct, rendering suppression 
inappropriate. Id. (“About all that exclusion would deter in 
this case is conscientious police work.”). 
 
 B. The District Court’s Reliance on Davis 
 In the case at bar, the District Court refused to “stray[] 
from the limitations set forth in Davis and expand[] the good 
faith exception.” Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9–10. It 
viewed Davis as setting forth a requirement that there be 
relevant binding precedent within the circuit. Id. at *7. 
Because no binding Third Circuit precedent specifically 
authorized the agents’ actions, it reasoned that applying the 
good faith exception would involve “[e]xtending” the holding 
of Davis from binding appellate precedent to an area of 
unsettled law. Id. at *7, *9. Still, it acknowledged that “an 
argument could be made . . . that the more general good faith 
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exception language” permits “individualized determination” 
of whether law enforcement acted objectively reasonably in 
specific cases. Id. at *9. It also “hasten[ed] to emphasize” its 
lack of concern that the agents acted in a “calculated or 
otherwise deliberately cavalier or casual manner in the hopes 
of just meeting the outer limits of the constitutional contours 
of [Appellees’] rights.” Id. at *10 n.15. It admitted that the 
agents “could well profess surprise at the specific outcome of 
Jones.” Id. Despite these conclusions, however, the District 
Court refused “to move beyond the strict Davis holding,” and 
it suppressed the evidence against Appellees.8 Id. at *9. 
Appellees urge us to adopt the District Court’s interpretation 
of Davis. They argue that no binding appellate precedent 
under Davis existed upon which the agents could reasonably 
rely, and they warn us to refrain from “fabricat[ing] a new 
ground for application of the ‘good faith’ exception”: reliance 
on a “settled body of persuasive authority.” (Appellees’ 
Corrected Supplemental En Banc Brief (“Appellee En Banc 
Br.”) at 3–4.)  
 
 C. The agents acted in good faith under both Davis 
  v. United States and the general good faith  
  exception. 
                                              
8 The District Court relied on “policy issues” it believed 
militated against “[e]xtending Davis” and applying the good 
faith exception. Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9. 
Specifically, it questioned the practicality of assigning 
authoritative weight to out-of-circuit decisions, noted that the 
good faith exception generally involved “reliance on 
unequivocally binding legal authority,” and concluded that 
reliance on out-of-circuit authority “at least border[ed] on 
being categorized as systemic negligence.” Id.    
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 We disagree with the District Court in two respects. 
First, we conclude that the exclusionary rule should not apply 
because, at the time of the agents’ conduct in this case, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984) were binding appellate precedent upon which the 
agents could reasonably have relied under Davis. In the 
alternative, we conclude that, under the Supreme Court’s 
more general good faith test, the evidence should not be 
suppressed because the agents acted with a good faith belief 
in the lawfulness of their conduct that was “objectively 
reasonable.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 
  1. Knotts and Karo were binding appellate  
  precedent upon which the agents could   
  reasonably have relied under Davis. 
 As an initial matter, it is self-evident that Supreme 
Court decisions are binding precedent in every circuit. See, 
e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 260–61 (2d Cir. 
2013) (rejecting contention that “binding appellate precedent” 
must be in-circuit precedent). The question remains whether 
the agents’ reliance on Knotts and Karo was “objectively 
reasonable.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428. We believe it was. 
Although the underlying facts in the cases differed—which 
will nearly always be true—the rationale underpinning the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo clearly 
authorized the agents’ conduct. 
  
 For a law enforcement officer’s conduct to fall under 
the ambit of Davis, a court must answer in the affirmative that 
he or she has “conduct[ed] a search [or seizure] in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” Id. If that 
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is the case, this “absence of police culpability dooms” 
motions to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to an 
allegedly illegal search or seizure. Id. The concept of 
“objectively reasonable reliance” for good faith purposes has 
been in practice since long before Davis was decided and 
requires answering “whether a reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that [a] search was illegal . . . . [under] all 
of the circumstances . . . .” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23; see 
also Herring, 555 U.S. at 142 (noting that case law often 
refers to “objectively reasonable reliance” as “good faith”). 
The “circumstance” at the forefront of Davis’ analysis is the 
existence of binding appellate precedent, and the dispositive 
inquiry is whether reliance upon it is “objectively 
reasonable.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.  
  
 As a threshold matter, we note that our inquiry is two-
fold. The agents magnetically attached a battery-operated 
GPS onto the undercarriage of Harry Katzin’s van and 
tracked its movements for two days. Jones analyzed this kind 
of conduct as a singular act. 132 S. Ct. at 949 (installation of 
GPS and its use to track vehicle are a search). However, prior 
to Jones, GPS or GPS-like surveillance was, for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, often treated as two distinct acts: (1) 
installation of the surveillance device, and (2) use of the 
device to track suspects’ movements. See, e.g., Karo, 468 
U.S. at 711–13 (analyzing Fourth Amendment implications of 
beeper installation); id. at 713–18 (analyzing Fourth 
Amendment implications of beeper surveillance); Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 279 n.** (granting certiorari on Fourth Amendment 
implications of beeper use, but passing on installation); 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215–16 
(9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing GPS installation separately from 
use), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012), remanded to 688 F.3d 
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1087 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we analyze the 
reasonableness of the agents’ reliance upon binding appellate 
precedent under Davis with respect to both of these Fourth 
Amendment acts. 
 
 It was objectively reasonable for the agents to rely 
upon Karo in concluding that the warrantless installation of 
the GPS device was legal. In Karo, an agent with the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) learned that James Karo and 
others had ordered, for use in cocaine smuggling, fifty gallons 
of ether from a government informant. 468 U.S. at 708. With 
the informant’s consent, the Government substituted one of 
the informant’s cans of ether with its own can, which 
contained a beeper. Id. Karo picked up the ether and took the 
“bugged” can into his car. Id. For over four months, DEA 
agents intermittently monitored the beeper to determine the 
location of the can. Id. at 708–10. The Government had 
obtained a court order authorizing this conduct, but it was 
subsequently invalidated, and, on appeal, the Government did 
not challenge its invalidation. Id. at 708, 710. Thus, when the 
case reached the Supreme Court, it presented the question 
whether the beeper’s warrantless installation was legal. Id. at 
711. 
 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the warrantless 
installation of the beeper, holding that it infringed no Fourth 
Amendment rights. Id. at 713. It reasoned that the transfer to 
Karo of the can containing the unmonitored beeper was not a 
search because the transfer conveyed no information, and 
therefore infringed no privacy interest. Id. at 712. Nor was the 
transfer a seizure despite the “technical trespass on the space 
occupied by the beeper,” which the Court admitted was an 
“unknown and unwanted foreign object.” Id. In so holding, 
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the Court broadly discredited the relevance of trespass in the 
context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: “[A] physical 
trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether 
the Fourth Amendment has been violated, . . . for an actual 
trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a 
constitutional violation.” Id. at 712–13. 
  
 The magnetic attachment of an unmonitored GPS unit 
onto the exterior of Harry Katzin’s vehicle, like the mere 
transfer of a can containing an unmonitored beeper, did not 
convey any information. It would have been objectively 
reasonable for a law enforcement officer to conclude, prior to 
Jones and in reliance on Karo, that such conduct was not a 
search because it infringed no privacy interest. The same 
result applies to the “trespass” of the GPS device (also an 
“unknown and unwanted foreign object”) upon Harry 
Katzin’s vehicle. It would have been objectively reasonable 
for a law enforcement officer to conclude that Karo’s 
sweeping rejection of the trespass theory applied not only the 
DEA agents’ elaborate ruse therein, but also to the 
unremarkable strategy of magnetically attaching a battery-
operated GPS unit onto the exterior of a vehicle. In sum, 
although the facts of this case differ from Karo’s, the 
Supreme Court’s rationale was broad enough to embrace the 
agents’ conduct, and their reliance on this binding appellate 
precedent was objectively reasonable under Davis. 
 
 It was also objectively reasonable for the agents to rely 
upon Knotts and Karo in concluding that the warrantless 
monitoring of the GPS device was legal. In Knotts, like Karo, 
law enforcement arranged for a suspect to voluntarily take 
into his vehicle a container that, unbeknownst to him, 
contained a beeper. 460 U.S. at 278. The police thereby 
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monitored his travels on public roads. Id. The Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
surveillance, holding that “[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.” Id. at 281; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–16, 721 
(reaffirming Knotts but clarifying that monitoring beeper 
inside private residence violates Fourth Amendment due to 
reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed therein). This is so 
because a traveler on public streets “voluntarily convey[s]” to 
any observer the “particular roads” over which he travels, his 
“particular direction,” any stops he makes, and his “final 
destination.” 460 U.S. at 281–82. The Government’s 
surveillance “amounted principally” to legal conduct: 
physically following a suspect on public roads. Id. at 281. The 
beeper’s use changed little because “[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting [their] 
sensory faculties . . . with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them in this case.” Id. at 282. 
  
 With respect to surveillance, the agents here engaged 
in nearly identical conduct to that authorized in Knotts. 
Appellees “voluntarily conveyed” their travels over public 
roads and the information gathered by the GPS device was 
indistinguishable from that which physical surveillance would 
have revealed. See id. at 281–82. Again, the breadth of the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Knotts and Karo encompasses 
the agents’ conduct, and we conclude that reliance upon this 
binding appellate precedent was objectively reasonable under 
Davis. In so concluding, we join a number of our sister 
circuits in deciding that, for the purposes of the good faith 
inquiry as applied to these facts, the technological distinctions 
between the beepers of yesteryear and the GPS device used 
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herein are irrelevant. See Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 255, 261 
(deciding that beeper used in Knotts was “sufficiently 
similar” to GPS device employed for approximately six 
months); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 
2013) (concluding that “Knotts clearly authorized” law 
enforcement’s use, for eleven days, of GPS device instead of 
beeper); see also United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 205 
(6th Cir. 2014) (concluding that in-circuit beeper cases were 
binding appellate precedent for “sporadic[]” GPS use); United 
States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 835 (5th Cir. 2013) (same, for 
approximately two-day use). 
 
  We acknowledge, of course, that these cases are not 
factually identical to the agents’ conduct. The agents 
monitored Harry Katzin’s van for two days by GPS, not 
beeper. They clandestinely installed a battery-operated GPS 
by magnetically attaching it onto the undercarriage of his van 
rather than clandestinely tricking him into unwittingly taking 
the GPS device into his vehicle. Otherwise their conduct 
echoed that in Knotts and Karo. No two cases will be 
factually identical. While the underlying facts of the cases are 
obviously relevant to determining whether reliance is 
objectively reasonable, the question is not answered simply 
by mechanically comparing the facts of cases and tallying 
their similarities and differences. Rather, Davis’ inquiry 
involves a holistic examination of whether a reasonable 
officer would believe in good faith that binding appellate 
precedent authorized certain conduct, which is a scenario-
specific way of asking the broader question of whether the 
officer “act[ed] with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith 
belief’ that [his] conduct [was] lawful.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2427 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909). 
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 Undoubtedly, certain language in Davis invites a 
narrow reading, but we are not persuaded this interpretation is 
true to Davis’ holding. For instance, Davis found exclusion 
inappropriate where “binding appellate precedent specifically 
authorize[d] a particular police practice.” Id. at 2429. We 
construe, arguendo, this language narrowly to mean that the 
relied-upon case must affirmatively authorize the precise 
conduct at issue in the case under consideration. Stated as a 
syllogism, if binding appellate precedent specifically 
authorizes the precise conduct under consideration, then it 
will likely be binding appellate precedent upon which police 
can reasonably rely under Davis. However, this does not 
make the reverse syllogism true, namely, that if a case is 
binding appellate precedent under Davis, then it must 
specifically authorize the precise conduct under 
consideration. Davis’ holding is broader: “[e]vidence 
obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on 
binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Id. 
While reliance is likely reasonable when the precise conduct 
under consideration has been affirmatively authorized by 
binding appellate precedent, it may be no less reasonable 
when the conduct under consideration clearly falls well 
within rationale espoused in binding appellate precedent, 
which authorizes nearly identical conduct. 
 
 Accordingly, what is far more important to our 
conclusion is that, despite these few dissimilarities, the 
agents’ nearly identical conduct fits squarely within the 
rationale of these decisions. We, therefore, believe that, at the 
time of the conduct at issue here, Knotts and Karo were 
binding appellate precedent, which could reasonably be relied 
on, under Davis. At least one other circuit has held so and 
explicitly rejected the contention that binding appellate 
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precedent must be “(1) within the Circuit and (2) specific to 
the facts at hand.” Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 260–61 (holding that, 
before Jones, Knotts and Karo were binding appellate 
precedent under Davis for purposes of GPS installation and 
surveillance of a vehicle on public roads); see also United 
States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (Knotts 
and Karo are binding appellate precedent for purposes of 
consensual GPS installation and subsequent surveillance). 
  
 2. Suppression is inappropriate because the 
agents  acted under an objectively reasonable good 
faith   belief that their conduct was lawful.  
  a. The alleged inapplicability of Davis does 
  not control the issue. 
 
 Alternatively, even if we were to accept Appellees’ 
argument that factual dissimilarities disqualify Knotts and 
Karo from being “binding appellate precedent” which could 
reasonably be relied on under Davis, our inquiry would not 
end there. In advancing their contrary position, the District 
Court and Appellees improperly elevate Davis’ holding above 
the general good faith analysis from whence it came. Davis is 
but one application of the good faith exception that applies 
when police “conduct a search in objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding judicial precedent.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2428. Undoubtedly, Davis is the most analogous Supreme 
Court decision to the instant circumstances. However, even if 
Davis did not mandate the application of the good faith 
exception, we can still apply the exception for another good 
reason. Cf. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001) 
(rejecting the “dubious logic . . . that an opinion upholding 
the constitutionality of a particular search implicitly holds 
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unconstitutional any search that is not like it”). The whole of 
our task is not to determine whether Davis applies, nor to 
“extend” either the good faith exception or Davis’ holding. 
Even where Davis does not control, it is our duty to consider 
the totality of the circumstances to answer the “objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal.”9 Leon, 
468 U.S. at 906–07, 922 n.23 (noting that exclusion inquiries 
“must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of 
[suppression]” (emphasis added)). To exclude evidence 
simply because law enforcement fell short of relying on 
binding appellate precedent would impermissibly exceed the 
Supreme Court’s mandate that suppression should occur in 
only “unusual” circumstances: when it “further[s] the 
                                              
9 The District Court noted that the Supreme Court’s good 
faith decisions generally involved reliance on some 
“unequivocally binding” authority, which does not include 
non-binding case law. Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9; see 
also supra note 7. However, in the Supreme Court’s many 
enunciations of the governing standard, it has never made 
such authority a condition precedent to applying the good 
faith exception. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (noting 
that suppression “turns on the culpability of the police and the 
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct”); 
Evans, 514 U.S. at 13–14 (suppression appropriate “only if 
the remedial objectives of the rule are thought most 
efficaciously served”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (good faith 
exception requires “objectively reasonable belief that . . . 
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment”). We do no 
more than apply the good faith exception as articulated by the 
Supreme Court. 
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purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 918; see also Duka, 
671 F.3d at 346. 
 
 Davis supports this conclusion. In reaching its holding, 
Davis reiterates the analytical steps for evaluating suppression 
challenges. 131 S. Ct. at 2426–28. For example, we must 
limit operation of the exclusionary rule “to situations in which 
[its] purpose,” deterring future Fourth Amendment violations, 
is “most efficaciously served.” Id. at 2426 (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). Our analysis 
must account for both “[r]eal deterrent value” and 
“substantial social costs,” and our inquiry must focus on the 
“flagrancy of the police misconduct” at issue. Id. at 2427 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 911). Only when, after a 
“rigorous weighing,” we conclude that “the deterrence 
benefits of suppression . . . outweigh its heavy costs,” is 
exclusion appropriate. Id. Importantly, we must be prepared 
to “appl[y] this ‘good-faith’ exception across a range of 
cases.”10 Id. at 2428.  
                                              
10 Moreover, we note that Justice Sotomayor understood 
Davis explicitly to leave open the question “whether the 
exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the 
constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled.” Davis, 
131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Similarly, 
Justice Breyer did not read Davis to limit the good faith 
exception only to “binding appellate precedent.” Id. at 2439 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that culpability rationale 
could similarly excuse as good faith a search which an officer 
“believes complies with the Constitution but which . . . falls 
just outside the Fourth Amendment’s bounds [or] where 
circuit precedent is simply suggestive rather than ‘binding,’ 
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 Davis did not begin, nor end, with binding appellate 
precedent. Rather, binding appellate precedent informed—
and ultimately determined—the Supreme Court’s greater 
inquiry: whether the officers’ conduct was deliberate and 
culpable enough that application of the exclusionary rule 
would “yield meaningfu[l] deterrence,” and “be worth the 
price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 2428 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). We must conduct the same analysis 
on the facts before us, even in the absence of binding 
appellate precedent.11 
 
 The District Court acknowledged the argument that the 
“general good faith exception language” could permit an 
“individualized determination” of whether the agents’ 
                                                                                                     
where it only describes how to treat roughly analogous 
instances, or where it just does not exist”). 
11 Appellees’ warning not to “fabricate” a new good faith 
ground exemplifies this misreading of Davis. (Appellee En 
Banc Br. at 4.) The Davis Court did not “fabricate” binding 
appellate precedent as a ground for applying the good faith 
exception. The facts involved binding appellate precedent, but 
the ground for applying the good faith exception was—as it 
has been since Leon—that the deterrence rationale was 
unsatisfied.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29 (noting the 
“absence of police culpability” and that excluding evidence 
would deter only “objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919)). The factual 
circumstances before us differ, but we ground our application 
of the good faith exception in the same time-tested 
considerations.  
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conduct was objectively reasonable. Katzin, 2012 WL 
1646894, at *8. This determination would have been properly 
informed by its conclusion that the agents’ inadvertent Fourth 
Amendment violation was neither “calculated” nor the result 
of a “deliberately cavalier or casual” attitude toward 
Appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights, and that the agents 
were likely “surprise[d]” by Jones.” Id. at *10 n.15; see also 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“‘never applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct” 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144)). However, the District 
Court declined to apply the good faith exception on the theory 
that doing so would implicate or “extend” the “strict Davis 
holding.” Id. at *9–10. This conclusion prevented the District 
Court from answering, as was its duty, the “objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal . . . . 
[under] all of the circumstances . . . .” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
n.23.  
 
   b. The Legal Landscape 
 In applying the good faith exception analysis to the 
agents’ conduct, we initially address the precise conduct at 
issue and the legal landscape at the time the agents acted. The 
agents magnetically attached a battery-operated GPS onto the 
undercarriage of Harry Katzin’s van and tracked its 
movements for two days. As noted above, we analyze the 
reasonableness of the agents’ conduct as would a pre-Jones 
court, namely, by separately considering installation and 
surveillance. E.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 711–18.  
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 Application of the good faith exception turns on 
whether the agents, at the time they acted, would have or 
should have known their installation of the GPS and their 
subsequent monitoring of Harry Katzin’s vehicle were 
unconstitutional. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 348–49. Relevant to 
this determination are the Supreme Court’s case law dealing 
with electronic surveillance and general searches of 
automobiles, subsequent treatment of GPS or GPS-like 
surveillance across the federal courts, and other 
considerations.  
  
    i. Knotts and Karo 
 Until Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the 
Supreme Court’s primary Fourth Amendment inquiry was 
whether the Government committed a physical trespass. See, 
e.g., id. at 352 (noting that the absence of trespass was once 
“thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry”). 
Katz changed this, famously declaring that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.” Id. at 351, 353 
(“[T]he reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon 
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion . . . . [T]he 
‘trespass’ doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as 
controlling.”). Subsequently, Katz was widely regarded as 
having jettisoned reliance on physical trespass in resolving 
Fourth Amendment challenges. See, e.g., United States v. 
Santillo, 507 F.2d 629, 632 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that the 
“trespassory concepts” relied upon in earlier Fourth 
Amendment cases have been “discredited”). After Katz, the 
dominant Fourth Amendment inquiry became whether the 
Government had intruded upon a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); see also, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
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143 (1978) (noting that one’s “capacity” to invoke Fourth 
Amendment protections depends upon whether one has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, not a property right, in the 
invaded place). 
 
 In Knotts and Karo, the Supreme Court applied this 
rationale to electronic surveillance of vehicles. We 
incorporate our earlier discussion of these cases, pausing only 
to reiterate Knotts’ conclusion that “[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,” 460 U.S. at 281, as well as Karo’s broad rejection 
of the trespass theory in the context of electronic surveillance 
of vehicles: “[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant 
to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been 
violated, . . . for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” 468 U.S. at 
712–13. 
  
  Also relevant to the installation question are the 
Supreme Court’s conclusions that persons do not enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of their 
vehicles. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“The 
exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and 
thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’”); Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591–92 (1974) (plurality opinion) (no 
privacy interest infringed where search examined tire on 
wheel and took paint scrapings from exterior of vehicle in 
public parking lot). 
 
 Thus, at bottom, before Jones, Knotts and Karo 
established that no Fourth Amendment search occurred where 
officers used beeper-based electronics to monitor an 
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automobile’s movements on public roads because a person 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to that 
information. Additionally, the rationale they espoused 
informed the federal appeals courts’ subsequent treatment of 
direct installation of a GPS device onto the exterior of a 
vehicle. 
 
    ii. Out-of-Circuit Decisions 
 After Knotts and Karo, what resulted was a nearly 
uniform consensus across the federal courts of appeals that 
addressed the issue that the installation and subsequent use of 
a GPS or GPS-like device was not a search, or, at most, was a 
search but did not require a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasoning 
that GPS installation and use requires only reasonable 
suspicion, since monitoring on public roads is not a search); 
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215–16 (holding that mobile 
tracking device installation and use was not a search); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that GPS installation and use was not a search), abrogation 
recognized by United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 
2014); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that GPS installation was not a search); 
see also United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 256–58 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that beeper installation and use 
requires only reasonable suspicion, since monitoring on 
public roads is not a search).12 
                                              
12 Michael was also Eleventh Circuit law. See Bonner v. City 
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
(Fifth Circuit decisions before October 1, 1981 bind Eleventh 
Circuit). Michael was decided May 11, 1981. 645 F.2d at 252. 
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 The lone dissenting voice was United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), decided four 
months prior to the agents’ conduct here. Maynard (which 
became Jones on appeal to the Supreme Court) held that 
prolonged GPS surveillance of a vehicle “24 hours a day for 
four weeks” was a Fourth Amendment search because it 
invaded the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. 
at 555. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Knotts held only that a 
person travelling by vehicle on public roads had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, not that 
“such a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements whatsoever, world without end.” Id. at 557. 
Maynard thus focused on the quality and quantity of 
information gathered during the extended surveillance. Id. at 
562 (noting that prolonged surveillance, unlike short-term 
surveillance, exposes “what a person does repeatedly, what he 
does not do, and what he does ensemble,” thereby revealing 
more information than an isolated trip). It reasoned that the 
defendant’s movements were “not actually exposed to the 
public because the likelihood a stranger would observe all 
those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” Id. at 
560. 
 
 Thus, at the time the agents acted, in addition to the 
“beeper” authority of Knotts and Karo, three circuit courts 
expressly approved their use of a GPS or GPS-like device, 
and the lone dissenting voice involved surveillance of a far 
longer duration. 
 
    iii. AUSA Consultation 
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 Finally, the agents consulted with, and received 
approval from, an AUSA on their proposed conduct. It was 
DOJ policy at the time that a warrant was not required to 
install a battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public 
street and to surveil it on public roads. We have previously 
considered reliance on government attorneys in our good faith 
calculus and concluded that, based upon it in combination 
with other factors, “[a] reasonable officer would . . . have 
confidence in [a search’s] validity.”13 United States v. Tracey, 
597 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). 
 
 Jones fundamentally altered this legal landscape by 
reviving—after a forty-five year hibernation—the Supreme 
Court’s prior trespass theory. 132 S. Ct. at 952 (declaring that 
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry did not substitute 
for “common-law trespassory test”). As the Ninth Circuit 
recently stated: “The agents in Jones labored under the 
misconception that the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
test exclusively marked the [Fourth] Amendment’s 
boundaries. Cases fostering that impression were ubiquitous.” 
United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1094 n.8 (9th Cir. 
2013) (citation omitted) (citing numerous Supreme Court 
cases).  
                                              
13 At oral argument before the original panel, counsel for 
Appellee Mark Katzin conceded that we may properly 
consider the AUSA consultation in the totality of 
circumstances informing our good faith analysis. Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 52, United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187 
(3d Cir. 2013), vacated by United States v. Katzin, No. 12-
2548, 2013 WL 7033666 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2013) (No. 12-
2548).  
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 With this legal landscape in mind, we turn now to our 
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
 
 c. Applying the Good Faith 
 Exception 
 To reiterate, the exclusionary rule is a prudential 
doctrine designed solely to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. Marginal deterrence is, 
however, insufficient for suppression; rather, deterrence must 
be “appreciable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, and outweigh the 
heavy social costs of suppressing reliable, probative evidence, 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. This balancing act pivots upon the 
fulcrum of the “flagrancy of the police misconduct” at issue. 
Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 911). Thus, “[w]hen the police 
exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for 
Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is 
strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.” Id. (quoting 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, “when the police act with an objectively reasonable 
good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful . . . the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force and exclusion 
cannot pay its way.” Id. at 2427–28 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 907 n.6, 909, 919) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Accordingly, we must determine whether—on these 
particular facts—the agents acted with a good faith belief in 
the lawfulness of their conduct that was “objectively 
reasonable.” Id. If so, suppression is unwarranted. If, on the 
other hand, the agents “had knowledge, or may properly be 
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional 
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under the Fourth Amendment,” suppression is warranted. 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 348–49. When answering these questions, 
we consider “all of the circumstances” and confine our 
inquiry to the “objectively ascertainable question whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal” in light of that constellation of 
circumstances. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
 
 We conclude that when the agents acted, they did so 
upon an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the 
legality of their conduct, and that the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule therefore applies. The constellation of 
circumstances that appeared to authorize their conduct 
included well settled principles of Fourth Amendment law as 
articulated by the Supreme Court, a near-unanimity of circuit 
courts applying these principles to the same conduct, and the 
advice of an AUSA pursuant to a DOJ-wide policy. Given 
this panoply of authority, we cannot say that a “reasonably 
well trained officer would have known that the search was 
illegal,” id., nor that the agents acted with “deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for [Appellees’] 
Fourth Amendment rights,” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, suppression is inappropriate because it would 
not result in deterrence appreciable enough to outweigh the 
significant social costs of suppressing reliable, probative 
evidence, upon which the Government’s entire case against 
Appellees turns. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909. 
 
    i. Knotts and Karo 
 Knotts and Karo are seminal cases on the intersection 
of electronic surveillance of vehicles and the Fourth 
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Amendment. Before Jones, their conclusion that the Fourth 
Amendment was not implicated by the installation and use of 
a beeper to surveil vehicles on public thoroughfares, and the 
rationale that supported it, was hornbook law. See, e.g., 
Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (“Karo’s brushing off of the potential 
trespass fits logically with earlier Supreme Court decisions 
concluding that ‘the physical characteristics of an automobile 
and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacy 
therein.’” (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 112)); Sparks, 711 F.3d 
at 67 (“Knotts was widely and reasonably understood to stand 
for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment simply was 
not implicated by electronic surveillance of public automotive 
movements . . . .”). The agents would have been objectively 
reasonable to conclude that monitoring Harry Katzin’s van 
was constitutional, in large part, because it fell squarely 
within Knotts and Karo’s well-accepted rationale. Their 
targets were “person[s] travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares,” who had “no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in [their] movements from one place to another.” 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. It is undisputed that Appellees 
“voluntarily convey[ed]” to any observer the “particular 
roads” over which they traveled, their “particular direction,” 
their stops, and their “final destination.” Id. at 281–82. At no 
time did the GPS permit the agents to monitor inside “a 
private residence” or other area “not open to visual 
surveillance.” Karo, 468 U.S. at 714, 721.  
 
 Additionally, the agents would have been objectively 
reasonable to believe that installing the GPS device 
implicated no Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court 
had repeatedly stated that persons do not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of their vehicles. Class, 
475 U.S. at 114; see also Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 591. It was 
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also objectively reasonable for the agents to believe that 
installing a GPS was safe from a trespass challenge. Katz 
clearly stated that Fourth Amendment inquiries did not “turn 
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion.” 389 
U.S. at 353. The trespass doctrine had been “discredited.” 
Santillo, 507 F.2d at 632.  
 
 The agents also benefitted from Supreme Court 
precedent addressing trespass in the context of electronic 
surveillance of vehicles on public roads. Although Karo did 
not address direct installation, its renunciation of the trespass 
theory was broad enough for agents reasonably to conclude 
that the installation was “only marginally relevant” to 
Appellees’ Fourth Amendment rights and alone was “neither 
necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation.” 468 U.S. at 712–13. They could have reasonably 
believed that the only constitutionally significant act they 
engaged in was monitoring. Id. at 713 (rejecting trespass 
theory and noting that privacy violation, if any, was 
“occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper”). And, as 
discussed, the agents had no reason to believe the monitoring 
was illegal. 
   
    ii. Out-of-Circuit Decisions 
 The agents’ conduct also conformed to practices 
authorized by a “uniform treatment” of “continuous judicial 
approval” of warrantless GPS installation and use across the 
federal courts. See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 540–42 & n.8 (holding 
exclusionary rule inapplicable where illegal search was 
conducted in good faith reliance on, in part, holdings and 
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dicta of various courts of appeals).14 Specifically, when the 
agents acted, the Seventh,15 Eighth,16 and Ninth17 Circuits had 
all held that the installation of GPS or GPS-like devices upon 
the exterior of vehicles and their subsequent monitoring either 
was not a search or, at most, was a search but did not require 
a warrant.18 Their rationales were based on the same Supreme 
Court precedents we outline above, particularly Knotts.  
                                              
14 Although Peltier was applying the “old retroactivity 
regime” of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), Leon 
“explicitly relied on Peltier and imported its reasoning into 
the good-faith inquiry.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431–32. 
15 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98.  
16 Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10.  
17 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215–17; McIver, 186 F.3d at 
1126–27. 
18 The D.C. Circuit in Maynard broke from this consensus 
and held that prolonged GPS surveillance of the defendant’s 
vehicle “24 hours a day for four weeks” was a Fourth 
Amendment search. 615 F.3d at 555. The D.C. Circuit 
explicitly tailored its holding to the fact that surveillance of 
the defendant lasted for a month. Id. at 558, 560 (“Applying 
the foregoing analysis to the present facts, we hold the whole 
of a person’s movements over the course of a month is not 
actually exposed to the public . . . .”). It also relied 
exclusively on a reasonable expectation of privacy rationale, 
giving no hint at Jones’ revival of the trespass theory. Id. at 
559–61. We cannot conclude that from this sole departure 
from the consensus of the courts of appeals “a reasonably 
well trained officer would [or should] have known” that the 
more limited GPS surveillance in this case was illegal. Leon, 
468 U.S. at 922 n.23.  
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 By considering these non-binding decisions in our 
good faith analysis, we do no more than did the Supreme 
Court in Peltier. There, the Court considered the 
“constitutional norm” established by the courts of appeals 
when determining whether an officer “had knowledge, or 
[could] properly be charged with knowledge, that [a] search 
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 
542 (“[U]nless we are to hold that parties may not reasonably 
rely upon any legal pronouncement emanating from sources 
other than this Court, we cannot regard as blameworthy those 
parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing . . . 
constitutional norm.”).19  
 
    iii. AUSA Consultation 
 Finally, the agents’ consultation with the AUSA also 
supports our conclusion that a reasonable agent would have 
believed in good faith that the installation and surveillance of 
Harry Katzin’s vehicle was legal. Of course, the AUSA 
approved their conduct. But more importantly, the AUSA’s 
advice was given pursuant to a DOJ-wide policy—
presumably based upon the legal landscape we describe 
above—that the agents’ conduct did not require a warrant. 
                                              
19 This Court has also previously noted—albeit in limited 
ways—supportive out-of-circuit decisions in its good faith 
analyses. See, Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 664 (holding that officer 
relied in good faith upon warrant and noting that “the 
affidavit’s allegations would have been sufficient in the 
Eighth Circuit at the time”); Duka, 671 F.3d at 347 n.12 
(concluding that objective reasonableness of reliance on 
statute was “bolstered” by out-of-circuit decisions reviewing 
particular provision and declaring it constitutional). 
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Prosecutors are, of course, not “neutral judicial officers.” 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 917. We do not place undue weight on this 
factor, but we have previously considered it in our good faith 
analysis. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153; see also United States v. 
Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2009).   
  
 In light of the aforementioned legal landscape, when 
the agents installed the GPS device onto the undercarriage of 
Harry Katzin’s vehicle, and then used that device to monitor 
his vehicle’s movements on public thoroughfares for two 
days, we believe those agents exhibited “an objectively 
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] 
lawful.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 
909). Given the panoply of authority authorizing their actions, 
we cannot conclude that a “reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal,” Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922 n.23, nor that the agents acted with a “deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for [Appellees’] 
Fourth Amendment rights,” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Prior to Jones’ unforeseeable revival of the 
“discredited” trespass theory, Santillo, 507 F.2d at 632, a 
reasonable police officer would have concluded that the 
agents’ conduct did not require a warrant. Suppression in this 
case would only deter “conscientious police work.” Id. at 
2429. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence discovered as 
a result of the agents’ conduct would not “outweigh the 
resulting costs,” and “exclusion cannot ‘pay its way.’” Id. at 
2427–28 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6).20 
                                              
20 Our sister circuits’ complementary conclusions support this 
result. See Brown, 744 F.3d at 478 (Knotts and Karo are 
binding appellate precedent for purposes of consensual GPS 
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  d. Appellees’ Arguments  
Appellees argue that excluding the evidence against 
them would achieve appreciable deterrence because it would 
prevent investigators and prosecutors from “engaging in 
overly aggressive readings of non-binding authority” and 
deter law enforcement from “‘act[ing] in a constitutionally 
                                                                                                     
installation and subsequent surveillance); Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 
261 (same, for purposes of nonconsensual installation and 
subsequent surveillance); Sparks, 711 F.3d at 67 (Knotts is 
binding appellate precedent where police install GPS and 
surveil vehicle’s movements). Although the Seventh Circuit 
left open the question of nonconsensual GPS installation, it 
strongly suggested that applying the good faith exception 
would be appropriate based upon out-of-circuit authority. 
Brown, 744 F.3d at 478 (doubting deterrent effect of 
prohibiting police from relying on out-of-circuit authority 
“just because the circuit . . . lacks its own precedent”). We 
also note that the First Circuit did not clearly distinguish 
where its reliance on Knotts ended and reliance on its own 
precedent began. See Sparks, 711 F.3d at 67 (relying on both 
Knotts and United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 
1977), abrogation recognized by United States v. Oladosu, 
744 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2014)). However, it relied on Knotts for 
the same reasons we highlight. See id. at 66–67 (declaring 
that Knotts was “widely and reasonably understood” to mean 
electronic surveillance of vehicles on public roads did not 
implicate Fourth Amendment and that it “clearly authorized” 
use of GPS in place of beeper). Finally, as noted earlier, our 
sister circuits have routinely concluded, as we do on these 
facts, that there is no relevant distinction between beepers and 
GPS devices for good faith purposes.  
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reckless fashion’ by taking constitutional inquiries into their 
own hands.” (Appellee En Banc Br. at 5 (quoting Katzin, 732 
F.3d at 212).) To so hold would lead to the same result as the 
District Court’s erroneous application of Davis: the good faith 
exception would not apply unless our own Court had 
established binding appellate precedent directly on point and 
approving the officer’s conduct. Put differently, all innocently 
(though later deemed illegally) gathered evidence would be 
excluded unless the police conduct discovering it was 
expressly permitted at the time the conduct occurred. But the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter “wrongful police 
conduct.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. And exclusion is only 
appropriate when doing so “most efficaciously serve[s]” that 
purpose. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. The mere act of deciding 
that conduct is lawful based upon a “constitutional norm” 
rather than binding appellate precedent is unlike the highly 
culpable conduct that helped establish the exclusionary rule. 
See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 143 (listing cases and noting 
that “the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule 
featured intentional conduct that was patently 
unconstitutional”).  
 
No doubt, sometimes officers’ reliance on non-binding 
authorities will fall short of an “objectively reasonable” good 
faith belief in the legality of their conduct. Suppression may 
then be appropriate to deter such reliance. It is equally 
elementary that close cases will be difficult.21 But in many 
                                              
21 We are unpersuaded by Appellees’ warning that our 
holding will require a “complicated judgment about whether 
non-binding case law is sufficiently ‘settled’ and 
‘persuasive.’” (Appellee En Banc Br. at 6.) The Fourth 
Amendment routinely requires courts to make difficult 
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other cases, law enforcement will likely correctly conclude, 
based upon a panoply of non-binding authority establishing a 
“constitutional norm,” Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542, that a 
particular police practice does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. The value in deterring such conduct is low. 
Additionally, adopting such a bright-line rule may 
impermissibly avoid our duty to conduct in each case a 
“rigorous weighing” of suppression’s costs and benefits, 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, and to consider “all of the 
circumstances” to determine the “objectively ascertainable 
question whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 
922 n.23. We would also risk “generat[ing] disrespect for the 
law and administration of justice” by applying the 
exclusionary rule so indiscriminately. Id. at 908 (quoting 
Stone, 428 U.S. at 491). 
 
Because such a bright-line rule would supplant the 
required balancing act, we would have to be confident that in 
every conceivable future case, the substantial costs of 
suppression would be outweighed by the value of deterring 
police from relying on a “constitutional norm” simply 
because it had yet to be expressly established by precedential 
opinion in the Third Circuit. We have no such confidence and 
Appellees do little to assuage our concerns. Appellees’ good 
faith calculus conspicuously fails to confront the “cost” side 
of the equation, which they dismiss as “minimal.” (Appellee 
En Banc Br. at 8.) However, the Supreme Court has routinely 
                                                                                                     
determinations of reasonableness. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
requires courts to “slosh . . . through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness’”). 
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stated the opposite; the cost of suppression is “substantial,” 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, because it often excludes “reliable, 
trustworthy evidence” of a defendant’s guilt, “suppress[es] 
the truth and set[s] [a] criminal loose in the community 
without punishment,” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. Here, by all 
appearances, the Government’s evidence against Appellees is 
substantial, and it is uncontested that the Government would 
have no case without it. The costs of exclusion are high. 
 
The boundaries of the good faith exception are a 
sufficient deterrent to the conduct Appellees find 
objectionable. Law enforcement personnel will either tread 
cautiously or risk suppression.22 The legal authority relied 
upon must support an “objectively reasonable good faith 
belief” that specific conduct is constitutional. Id. (quoting 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 909) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Consequently, nothing in our holding today conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s instructions to executive officers to “err on 
                                              
22 As the Supreme Court noted in Leon, “the possibility that 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline 
cases is unlikely to encourage police instructors to pay less 
attention to fourth amendment limitations. . . . [nor] 
encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are 
taught, as the requirement that the officer act in ‘good faith’ is 
inconsistent with closing one’s mind to the possibility of 
illegality.” 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 (quoting Jerold Israel, 
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the 
Warren Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1412–13 (1977)). The 
Supreme Court has also recognized the “increasing evidence 
that police forces across the United States take the 
constitutional rights of citizens seriously.” Hudson, 547 U.S. 
at 599. 
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the side of constitutional behavior,” United States v. Johnson, 
457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982), and in “doubtful or marginal 
case[s]” to obtain a warrant, Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)). We do 
not believe this case to be either doubtful or marginal.23 
 
In any event, just because law enforcement officers 
may one day unreasonably rely on non-binding authority does 
not absolve us of our duty to decide whether, under these 
facts, the agents’ conduct was “sufficiently deliberate” that 
deterrence will be effective and “sufficiently culpable” that 
deterrence outweighs the costs of suppression. Herring, 555 
U.S. at 144. In this case neither standard is satisfied. Future 
decisions may reveal that applying the good faith exception to 
reliance on non-binding authority should be extremely rare, 
perhaps as rare as tectonic shifts in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence such as Jones. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433 
(noting the infrequency with which the Supreme Court 
overrules its Fourth Amendment precedents). But that is a 
question for another day.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 
District Court suppressing the evidence discovered in Harry 
                                              
23 Appellees also argue that, under our holding, courts will 
“defer to ‘adjuncts of the law enforcement team’ on the 
difficult question of whether a particular legal issue is the 
subject of ‘settled’ and ‘persuasive’ law.” (Appellee En Banc 
Br. at 7.) The good faith analysis is not deferential. That 
courts may be required to consider whether reliance on non-
binding authority is objectively reasonable does not change 
the governing inquiry. 
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Katzin’s van and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
1 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by 
McKEE, Chief Judge, and AMBRO, FUENTES, and SMITH, 
Circuit Judges. 
 Once touted as a way to ensure that the rights of 
citizens are protected from overzealous law enforcement, 
today the exclusionary rule’s very existence, long eroding, is 
in serious doubt.  Since the inception of the exclusionary rule, 
critics have disputed its validity.  In words often quoted, [then 
Judge] Cardozo questioned whether “[t]he criminal is to go 
free because the constable has blundered.”  People v. Defore, 
150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  Courts have given power to 
the words of the critics by using the good faith exception to 
chip away at the breadth of the rule.  The majority, in its 
alternative holding, expands the good faith exception to the 
point of eviscerating the exclusionary rule altogether by 
failing to provide any cognizable limiting principle.  Now, 
law enforcement shall be further emboldened knowing that 
the good faith exception will extricate officers from nearly 
any evidentiary conundrum.      
 Law enforcement violated Katzin’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.1   In this case, the only means by which 
                                              
1 That the GPS placed on Katzin’s vehicle violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights was not argued before the Third Circuit en 
banc, as argument was restricted to the question of the 
applicability of good faith.  Before a good faith analysis can 
proceed, there must first be a finding that a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred.  The majority downplays the 
significance of this requirement, noting that “we need not 
determine whether the agents’ conduct was an unreasonable 
search because, even assuming so, we conclude that the good 
faith exception applies . . . .”  Majority Op. at 10-11.  
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the evidence obtained through such a violation could be used 
against Katzin is through application of the good faith 
exception.  To achieve this end, the majority argues that good 
faith applies, even without the existence of binding appellate 
precedent.  What law enforcement did in this case was to 
“rely on precedent to resolve legal questions as to which 
‘[r]easonable minds . . .  may differ . . . .’”  United States v. 
Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2419 (2011) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
914 (1984)).  In such an instance, “the exclusionary rule is 
well-tailored to hold [law enforcement] accountable for their 
mistakes.”  Id.  The majority disagrees with this proposition 
and instead gives free rein to law enforcement to interpret 
legal propositions without any consequence if and when they 
are wrong.   
 Law enforcement contends that they acted reasonably 
by consulting with their co-investigators at the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.  However, what is missing here is neutral 
authorization of any sort for the conduct undertaken by the 
police.  Consultation with the U.S. Attorney’s Office is not a 
panacea for the constitutional issues raised here.  Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (“It is apparent that 
                                                                                                     
However, simultaneously, the majority notes that “[a] panel 
of this Court unanimously affirmed the District Court’s 
conclusions that the agents’ conduct required a warrant and 
that all three brothers had standing.”  Majority Op. at 9.  
Here, the agents’ conduct constituted an unreasonable search, 
and this finding is a predicate to any good faith analysis.   
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 
(2011) (acknowledging the constitutional violation before 
proceeding to the good faith analysis). 
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the agents in this case acted with restraint.  Yet the 
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the 
agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.  They were not 
required, before commencing the search, to present their 
estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral 
magistrate.  They were not compelled, during the conduct of 
the search itself, to observe precise limits established in 
advance by a specific court order.  Nor were they directed, 
after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing 
magistrate in detail of all that had been seized.”) (emphasis 
added).  Even if the majority believes that this neutral 
authorization requirement (which admittedly pre-dates the 
good faith exception) has been undercut by subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions, we are still required to follow it.  
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).  Neutral 
authorization for law enforcement’s actions has been the 
hallmark of the good faith exception’s application.  Without 
this control, what is the fail-safe to preclude further erosion?  
I fear there is none.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
 In its primary holding, the majority turns the rationale 
of Davis on its head and concludes that two disparate 
Supreme Court precedents—that the Government concedes 
do not constitute binding appellate precedent—now fit the 
bill.2  How does the majority justify the creation of such a 
                                              
2 At oral argument, the Government stated that its position 
regarding United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and 
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notion?  Such a leap constitutes willful disregard of the 
critical distinctions between this case on the one hand and 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) on the other.  Further, 
this leap reveals the majority’s true purpose: to accommodate 
the desires of law enforcement.   
I. Expansion of the Good Faith Exception  
 The majority’s alternative holding, that good faith 
should apply even if it does not fit the Davis paradigm, is 
troubling.  The essence of the majority’s holding is that any 
time a course of conduct by the police, particularly regarding 
technological advancements, has not been tested or breaks 
new ground, law enforcement will be entitled to the good 
faith exception. 3   This directly contravenes one of the 
principles expounded in Davis: that evidence admitted 
pursuant to the good faith exception is so admitted because 
the police relied on binding appellate precedent that, as 
Justice Alito said in his majority opinion, “specifically 
authorize[d the] particular police practice . . . .”  Davis, 131 
S. Ct. at 2429 (emphasis added).  Indeed, as Justice 
Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, Davis did not “present 
                                                                                                     
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) is, “about one hair 
short of [binding appellate precedent].”  Tr. of Oral Argument 
at 6, United States v. Katzin,  ̶  F.3d  ̶  (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(No. 12-2548).   
3 At oral argument, the Government acknowledged that it was 
asking for an expansion of the good faith exception, to which, 
with today’s ruling, the majority has clearly acquiesced.  Id. 
at 23.   
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the markedly different question whether the exclusionary rule 
applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a 
particular search is unsettled.”  Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).4   
 I do not dispute the majority’s contention that “Davis 
is but one application of the good faith exception that applies 
when police ‘conduct a search in objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding judicial precedent.’”  Majority Op. at 25 
(quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428).  Instead, my point goes to 
the manner in which the good faith exception is being 
expanded.  It has everything to do with neutral authorization 
and with the ultimate decision-making not being in the hands 
of law enforcement.  This is what the framers envisioned 
                                              
4 The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Davis was also explicit on 
this point: “[We refuse] to apply the exclusionary rule when 
the police have reasonably relied on clear and well-settled 
precedent.  We stress, however, that our precedent on a given 
point must be unequivocal before we will suspend the 
exclusionary rule’s operation.”  Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Buford, 632 F.3d 264, 276 n.9 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Like the 
Eleventh Circuit, we also ‘stress, however, that our precedent 
on a given point must be unequivocal before we will suspend 
the exclusionary rule’s operation.’”  (quoting Davis, 598 F.3d 
at 1266)); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n.6 
(10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the good faith exception applied 
because “Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search 
was settled.  Thus, there was no risk that law enforcement 
officers would engage in the type of complex legal research 
and analysis better left to the judiciary and members of the 
bar”). 
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when they wrote the Fourth Amendment requiring that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.   
 Historically, the Supreme Court has held the good faith 
exception covers situations where law enforcement personnel 
have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on some 
seemingly immutable authority or information that justifies 
their course of action.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984) (later-invalidated warrant); Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984) (exclusionary rule 
inapplicable when warrant is invalid due to judicial clerical 
error); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (subsequently 
overturned statute); Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (later-reversed 
binding appellate precedent); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 
(1995) (undiscovered error in court-maintained database); 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (undiscovered 
error in police-maintained database).   
 It is clear from the line of good faith cases that the 
exception is limited to cases involving either: (a) non-
deterrable, isolated mistakes, or (b) cases in which police 
officers rely upon a neutral third-party’s authorization.5  Such 
delineated exceptions allow us to hold fast to the 
constitutional guarantee of “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.  Thus, “[i]t remains a cardinal principle that searches 
                                              
5 I limit my discussion to scenario (b) based on the facts of 
this case.   
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conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”  United States v. 
Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The majority’s opinion, absent 
such a guiding principle, has now leant its imprimatur to the 
notion that even if law enforcement’s conduct violates the 
Fourth Amendment, it is perfectly fine because the evidence 
can come in through good faith.  The exception becomes the 
rule.  
 The majority argues that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter wrongful conduct of law 
enforcement, and that here there is no wrongful conduct.  As 
the Supreme Court has explained, “police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter 
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; 
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (cautioning courts not to discourage 
“the officer from doing his duty”) (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The majority determines that 
acting on a good-faith mistake about the law, without seeking 
a warrant even when there was time to get one, is not conduct 
which should be deterred.  But Davis itself suggests that it is 
proper for the exclusionary rule to “punish” such an “error.”  
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.   
 Here, law enforcement personnel made a deliberate 
decision to forego securing a warrant before attaching a GPS 
device directly to a target vehicle in the absence of binding 
Fourth Amendment precedent authorizing such a practice.  
Indeed, the police embarked on a long-term surveillance 
project using technology that allowed them to monitor a 
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target vehicle’s movements using only a laptop, all before 
either this Circuit or the Supreme Court had spoken on the 
constitutional propriety of such an endeavor.  In an area 
without any guidance from the Supreme Court or from our 
Circuit, law enforcement and the prosecutors looked to our 
sister circuits to find the universe of case law that supported 
the most beneficial position to them.  For purposes of our 
analysis, we may not assume that Knotts and Karo were 
binding appellate precedent simply because that is what law 
enforcement, with assistance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
concluded at the time of their decision to place the GPS on 
Katzin’s van.  Thus, law enforcement made a deliberate 
decision implicating constitutional principles on the basis of a 
3-1 circuit split, absent any specific authorization for their 
conduct.  What if the split had been 2-2 or 1-3?  Is there a 
basis from which one can imagine that law enforcement’s 
decision would have been different? 
 True, the police did not act in a total vacuum, but their 
chosen course of action when presented with such a novel 
constitutional predicament is nonetheless worrisome.  In lieu 
of a binding proclamation from either this Circuit or the 
Supreme Court—and instead of seeking approval from a 
neutral magistrate—law enforcement personnel looked to 
other (non-binding or distinguishable) authorities like our 
sister circuits’ decisions.  Essentially, they extrapolated their 
own constitutional rule, in consultation with the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, and applied it to this case.  This intra-
executive agency consultation falls short of a basic 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment: that “where practical, 
a governmental search and seizure should represent both the 
efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and 
the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is 
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sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen’s private premises or 
conversation.”  United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 
407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).  Simply put, the police in this case 
dodged a basic constitutional separation of powers 
requirement by choosing to assume a constitutional rule not 
clearly established by binding judicial precedent.   
 I do not believe that this intra-executive consultation 
absolves police personnel’s behavior.  Now, the assumption 
by law enforcement that their own self-derived rule 
sanctioned their conduct becomes true, thanks to the 
majority’s analysis.  Such decision-making is wrongful 
conduct that can and should be deterred—for that is the 
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule!  The police practice 
at issue here effectively disregarded the possibility that we 
could find a GPS search constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
violation requiring a warrant.   
 Where we have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of 
a police tactic, law enforcement personnel have two choices: 
(a) assume that their conduct violates the Fourth Amendment 
and that we will require them to obtain a warrant, or (b) 
gamble, at the risk of having evidence excluded, that we will 
find no Fourth Amendment violation in a particular situation.  
This is in line with the Supreme Court’s suggestion that law 
enforcement officials should be incentivized to “err on the 
side of constitutional behavior.”  United States v. Johnson, 
457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).6  Excluding the evidence in this 
                                              
6  Johnson addressed retroactive application of Fourth 
Amendment decisions.  In discussing the matter, the Court 
stated: 
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case would incentivize just that and would therefore result in 
“appreciable deterrence” of future Fourth Amendment 
violations.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 I would not hold, of course, that the police can never 
make assumptions about our future Fourth Amendment 
rulings.  If their analysis is correct and we ultimately affirm 
the constitutionality of a search, then the police are rewarded 
with full use of any evidence derived from the search.  If their 
analysis is wrong, however, and the search is ultimately held 
to be unconstitutional, then the police cannot avoid the cost of 
                                                                                                     
If, as the Government argues, all rulings 
resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment 
questions should be nonretroactive, then, in 
close cases, law enforcement officials would 
have little incentive to err on the side of 
constitutional behavior.  Official awareness of 
the dubious constitutionality of a practice would 
be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so 
long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area 
remained unsettled, evidence obtained through 
the questionable practice would be excluded 
only in the one case definitively resolving the 
unsettled question.  Failure to accord any 
retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings 
would encourage police or other courts to 
disregard the plain purport of our decisions and 
to adopt a let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided approach. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561 (footnote and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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suppression by relying on the good faith exception.  Of 
course, the police can avoid this entire issue by requesting a 
warrant in the first instance, a task unburdened by time nor 
trouble.   
 Law enforcement personnel can rightly rely on a 
number of sources for Fourth Amendment guidance—
including relevant decisions by the Supreme Court and this 
Circuit, warrants, and statutes.  We, both as a court and as a 
society, expect that law enforcement officers will consult 
these sources—it is a part of how we expect reasonable 
officers to act.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.  Deterring such 
activity, therefore, would not serve the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule.  Id.  This case is different.  Nothing in a 
law enforcement officer’s duties forces him either to rely on 
non-binding appellate precedent or to conduct the Fourth 
Amendment calculus himself by extrapolating from, or 
analogizing to, existing case law.  Where an officer decides to 
take the Fourth Amendment inquiry into his own hands, 
rather than to seek a warrant from a neutral magistrate—
particularly where the law is as far from settled as it was 
here—he acts in a constitutionally reckless fashion. 
 The legal landscape in this case predominantly 
consisted of the out-of-circuit GPS cases, the Supreme 
Court’s beeper decisions, and the overarching privacy 
expectation framework for Fourth Amendment analysis 
adopted in Katz and deemed to be the sole rubric for analysis 
until United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  Taken 
together, the majority contends, these sources provide the 
legal authority that would lead a reasonable law enforcement 
officer to conclude that he was acting within the confines of 
the Constitution when attaching a GPS tracker to the 
undercarriage of Harry Katzin’s van.  I do not agree that this 
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collection of authority warrants application of the good faith 
exception because I remain discomfited by the lack of binding 
appellate guidance or other neutral authorization underlying 
the police action at issue here.  Therefore, I would hold that 
the police acted with sufficient constitutional culpability to 
require exclusion and, more importantly, that suppression in 
this case would help deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations. 
 My intention would not be to bind the hands of law 
enforcement.  I merely believe that the investigatory process 
established by the Constitution is the proper one: that police 
officers get a warrant prior to conducting a search.  This is 
also consistent with Karo, where the Court expressly rejected 
the Government’s argument that requiring a warrant prior to 
beeper tracking would be too laborious and would 
substantially impede investigations.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 
717 (“The Government’s contention that warrantless beeper 
searches should be deemed reasonable is based upon its 
deprecation of the benefits and exaggeration of the difficulties 
associated with procurement of a warrant.  The Government 
argues that the traditional justifications for the warrant 
requirement are inapplicable in beeper cases, but to a large 
extent that argument is based upon the contention, rejected 
above, that the beeper constitutes only a minuscule intrusion 
on protected privacy interests . . . . Requiring a warrant will 
have the salutary effect of ensuring that use of beepers is not 
abused, by imposing upon agents the requirement that they 
demonstrate in advance their justification for the desired 
search.”) (emphasis added). 
 Thus, I conclude that in the absence of binding 
appellate precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court, 
law enforcement must—as it has been required to do since the 
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founding of this country—comply with the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  This is clear and easy 
to follow.  This rule gives police officers not only sufficient 
discretion, but also sufficient guidance to achieve their 
objectives.   
II. Why Knotts and Karo Do Not Constitute Binding 
Appellate Precedent 
 The majority elects to make an alternative holding: 
that Knotts and Karo are binding appellate precedent. 7   I 
disagree.   
 Knotts and Karo stand for two propositions, only one 
of which the majority has elected to acknowledge.  First, in 
Knotts the Supreme Court held that “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares [generally] has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.  Second, the 
Supreme Court stated that there remained the possibility that 
twenty-four hour, “dragnet type law enforcement practices” 
could implicate “different constitutional principles.”  Id. at 
283-84.   
 The Supreme Court portended the exact case we have 
before us now.  The Court astutely foretold that 
                                              
7  While the Supreme Court has leant its imprimatur to 
alternative holdings, see, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates 
v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 346 n.4 (1986), in this instance I 
believe that the use of an alternative holding emphasizes the 
majority’s dubious faith in their argument that Knotts and 
Karo constitute binding appellate precedent.   
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improvements in technology that would permit twenty-four 
hour surveillance (i.e., GPS) might indeed present “different 
constitutional principles.”  Id.  And now that this case is 
before us, the majority ignores this second, critical takeaway 
from Knotts and misrepresents that it constitutes binding 
appellate precedent for purposes of permitting a Davis-based 
good faith exception ruling.   
 In addition to Knotts’ warning about “dragnet type law 
enforcement practices,” discussed in more detail below, there 
are three additional reasons why Knotts and Karo are not 
binding appellate precedent, contrary to the majority’s 
insistence: (1) the marked technological differences between 
beepers and GPS trackers, (2) the placement by police of the 
beepers inside containers with the consent of the owners in 
those cases, and (3) the uncertainty in this area of law created 
by the D.C. Circuit decision, United States v. Maynard, 615 
F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which preceded the application of 
the GPS device to the Katzin vehicle.       
 Technological Differences 
 Our case concerns a “slap-on” GPS tracker, so called 
because it magnetically attaches to the exterior of a target 
vehicle, is battery operated, and thereby requires no electronic 
connection to the automobile.  The tracker uses the Global 
Positioning System—a network of satellites originally 
developed by the military—to determine its own location 
with a high degree of specificity and then sends this data to a 
central server.  This check-and-report process repeats every 
few minutes (depending on the tracker), thereby generating a 
highly accurate record of the tracker’s whereabouts 
throughout its period of operation.  The great benefit of such 
a system—apart from its accuracy—is that anyone with 
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access to the central server can analyze or monitor the 
location data remotely.  These aspects make GPS trackers 
particularly appealing in law enforcement contexts, where the 
police can attach a tracker to some vehicle or other asset and 
then remotely monitor its location and movement. 
 GPS technology is vastly different from the more 
primitive tracking devices of yesteryear—“beepers.”  Beepers 
are nothing more than “radio transmitter[s], usually battery 
operated, which emit[] periodic signals that can be picked up 
by a radio receiver.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.  In contrast to 
GPS trackers, beepers do not independently ascertain their 
location—they only broadcast a signal that the police can then 
follow via a corresponding receiver.  Moreover, beeper 
signals are range-limited: if the police move far enough away 
from the beeper, they will be unable to receive the signal that 
the unit broadcasts.  At bottom, then, beepers are mere aids 
for police officers already performing surveillance of a target 
vehicle.  Unlike GPS trackers, beepers require that the police 
expend resources—time and manpower—to follow a target 
vehicle physically. 
 In a Ninth Circuit denial of a petition for rehearing on 
the GPS question, Chief Judge Kozinski issued a fiery dissent 
from the denial, accusing the Pineda-Moreno majority of 
being “inclined to refuse nothing” to the needs of law 
enforcement.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 
1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  In his 
dissent, the Chief Judge noted that GPS devices “have little in 
common with the primitive devices in Knotts,” in part 
because, unlike GPS devices, beepers “still require[] at least 
one officer—and usually many more—to follow the suspect.”  
Id. at 1124.  Thus, the dissent noted, while “[y]ou can 
preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by 
16 
 
traveling at night, through heavy traffic, in crowds, by using a 
circuitous route, disguising your appearance, passing in and 
out of buildings and being careful not to be followed,” there 
is “no hiding from the all-seeing network of GPS satellites 
that hover overhead, which never sleep, never blink, never get 
confused and never lose attention.”  Id. at 1126. 
 As noted above, the Knotts Court specifically indicated 
that, in contrast to the officers’ limited use of the beeper in 
that case, more expansive monitoring, (e.g., a “twenty-four 
hour,” “dragnet type law enforcement practice[]”) could 
implicate “different constitutional principles.”  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 283-84.  The Supreme Court, in issuing Knotts, did 
not want the case to stand for the proposition that new 
technology that allows for more invasive surveillance would 
automatically be permissible for the same reasons as allowed 
in Knotts.   
 In fact, in numerous cases, the Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals have expressed caution about the extension 
of their holdings regarding the permissibility of certain law 
enforcement conduct to situations involving future 
technology.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 
(2001) (“While the technology used in the present case was 
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”);8 see also United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 
                                              
8 See also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (“It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the 
advance of technology.  For example, as the cases discussed 
above make clear, the technology enabling human flight has 
exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official 
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994 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) (echoing the concern 
expressed in Knotts that it might need to reevaluate its 
conclusion if faced with a case concerning use of GPS 
technology for mass surveillance); United States v. Robinson, 
903 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785-87 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (“The need for 
caution in this age of developing technology should be clear.  
Other Supreme Court cases, by their rulings or their language, 
have given notice that earlier pronouncements may not 
control when the technology changes or the nature and degree 
of intrusion changes.”). 
 Even before Katz, when the Supreme Court articulated 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Supreme 
Court was balancing the “need for effective law enforcement 
against the right of privacy” in considering whether a 
particular situation constituted an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (considering warrantless 
searches based on probable cause).  The law enforcement 
community should have been on notice that they might not be 
entitled to use warrantless twenty-four hour surveillance 
through the use of new technology.   
Consent 
 Another critical difference between Knotts and Karo 
and Katzin is the presence or absence of consent.  The 
majority derisively dismisses this issue as an “elaborate ruse.”  
                                                                                                     
observation) uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage 
that once were private. The question we confront today is 
what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink 
the realm of guaranteed privacy.”) (citations omitted). 
18 
 
Majority Op. at 21.  However, the “elaborate ruse” enabled 
the law enforcement officers to place the beeper into a can of 
ether, with the can owner’s consent.  Karo, 468 U.S. at 708 
(“With Muehlenweg’s consent, agents substituted their own 
can containing a beeper for one of the cans in the shipment . . 
. .”).  Similarly, consent was present in Knotts because law 
enforcement placed a beeper into a container of chloroform 
with the consent of the chemical manufacturing company 
where the suspect purchased the chloroform.  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 278 (“With the consent of the Hawkins Chemical 
Company, officers installed a beeper inside a five gallon 
container of chloroform . . . .”).   
 It is true that both of these cases established the 
principle that no Fourth Amendment search occurs where 
officers use beeper-based electronics to monitor an 
automobile’s movement on public roads because a person has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that 
information.  However, neither case addressed the direct 
installation of a tracking device onto or into a vehicle, as is 
the case here.  First, the defendant in Knotts did not challenge 
the original installation of the beeper, but only the use of the 
information that it emitted.  See id. at 286 (“I think this would 
have been a much more difficult case if respondent had 
challenged, not merely certain aspects of the monitoring of 
the beeper installed in the . . . container . . . , but also its 
original installation.”) (Brennan, J., concurring); Karo, 468 
U.S. at 713 (“As the [Knotts] case came to us, the installation 
of the beeper was not challenged; only the monitoring was at 
issue.”).   
 This distinction is important, particularly in light of 
Jones’s determination that GPS tracking abridges Fourth 
Amendment rights on the ground that the installation of the 
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GPS constituted a trespass.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“The 
Government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such 
a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
first adopted.”).  When Knotts and Karo are applied to Katzin, 
consent is a critical difference that renders their use as 
binding appellate precedent doubtful.   
Maynard Muddies the Waters 
 Finally, there is the Maynard decision, which, if the 
technological differences and consent distinctions were not 
enough, sufficiently muddied the waters so that law 
enforcement officers could not know whether the attachment 
of a GPS device to the undercarriage of a vehicle would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit 
split from three sister circuits to hold that prolonged GPS 
surveillance constituted a search.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-
65.  In so doing, the court rejected the Knotts-based argument 
that a driver’s movements over the course of an entire month 
are exposed to the public and therefore do not constitute 
information shielded by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 560.  
This decision was rendered four months prior to the agents’ 
conduct at issue here.   
 At the same time, the court in Maynard rejected the 
applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, holding that while the exception “permits the 
police to search a car without a warrant if they have reason to 
believe it contains contraband[, it] . . . does not authorize 
them to install a tracking device on a car without the approval 
of a neutral magistrate.”  Id. at 567.  A year later, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, under the name United 
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States v. Jones.  131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Jones and Maynard 
were co-defendants).  Maynard thus focused on the quality 
and quantity of information gathered during the extended 
surveillance.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (noting that 
prolonged surveillance, unlike short-term surveillance, 
exposes “what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, 
and what he does ensemble,” revealing more information than 
an isolated trip). 
 This case should have given law enforcement pause as 
to the applicability of Knotts and Karo to the new world of 
GPS.  At the very least, they should have known that 
prolonged surveillance could be an issue and one that could 
be easily fixed by getting a search warrant from a neutral 
magistrate. 
 By its plain terms, the express holding in Davis is 
inapposite to this case because I believe that Knotts and Karo 
do not qualify as appropriate binding appellate precedent.  
Neither case involved a physical trespass onto the target 
vehicle; in both cases the police placed the beeper inside of a 
container which was then loaded into the target vehicle by the 
driver (all with the container owner’s permission).  See Karo, 
468 U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.  Additionally, both 
Karo and Knotts addressed the use of beepers, which—as I 
have already explained—are markedly different from GPS 
trackers.  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57. 
III. Conclusion 
 The majority’s good faith analysis is flawed because it 
finds that, where the law is unsettled, law enforcement may 
engage in constitutionally reckless conduct and still reap the 
benefits of the good faith exception.  Fourth Amendment 
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jurisprudence dictates a different outcome.  When the law is 
unsettled, law enforcement should not travel the road of 
speculation, but rather they should demonstrate respect for the 
constitutional mandate—obtain a warrant.  Anything less 
would require suppression.  I cannot condone the majority’s 
accommodation to law enforcement at the expense of our 
civil liberties.  I am compelled to dissent. 
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SMITH, J., Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by McKEE, 
Chief Judge, AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 I join Judge Greenaway’s eloquent dissent in its 
entirety.  There is little that can be added to Judge 
Greenaway’s devastating critique.  I write here only to 
expand on a worrisome facet of the majority’s reasoning.  
Because Knotts1 and Karo2 are factually distinguishable and 
did not hold that the specific conduct engaged in here by 
government agents was permissible, i.e., attaching a GPS 
device to Harry Katzin’s van, the majority is required to hold 
that the officers’ conduct was consistent with the “rationale 
underpinning” those decisions.  References to Supreme Court 
“rationale” are liberally sprinkled throughout the opinion.  
See Majority op. at 18, 21, 22, 24, 31, 36, 38.  If what the 
majority is suggesting is that law enforcement officers may 
rely not just on holdings, which are truly the stuff of 
precedent, but also on appellate court rationale, I find such a 
suggestion both troubling and impractical.  What is the 
limiting principle to be applied to these extrapolations?  And 
just what legal hermeneutic will lay police officers be 
applying as they engage in such on-the-spot analysis of the 
real-life cases they confront?  I can discern no ready answer 
to these questions.   
                                              
1  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
2  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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 I do see, however, considerable tension between an 
approach that permits law enforcement officers who invoke 
the good faith exception to take refuge in the rationale of 
certain Supreme Court cases, and the limiting language which 
the Supreme Court itself chose to employ in Davis which 
referred to binding precedent “specifically authoriz[ing]” a 
particular police practice.  United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 
2419, 2429 (2011).  The majority’s legal framework 
eliminates the objectively reasonable source underpinning the 
good faith exception: authorization from a neutral magistrate 
or binding judicial precedent.  Id. at 2428.  The law 
enforcement officers’ choice to commandeer the task of 
Fourth Amendment legal analysis in the face of patent 
ambiguity surely falls within the sort of “deliberate, reckless, 
or grossly negligent” conduct that provides a strong 
“deterrent value of exclusion” that may “outweigh the 
resulting costs.”  Id. at 2427 (quoting Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  By not cabining to the judiciary the analysis of 
ambiguous and, in this case, conflicting case law, the majority 
turns the warrant requirement on its head. 
 For this reason, and for those so ably expressed by 
Judge Greenaway, I respectfully dissent. 
